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Abstract
Many believe that the ethical problems of donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) have been “worked out”
and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted. In this paper we will argue that DCD donors may not yet be
dead, and therefore that organ donation during DCD may violate the dead donor rule. We first present a
description of the process of DCD and the standard ethical rationale for the practice. We then present our
concerns with DCD, including the following: irreversibility of absent circulation has not occurred and the many
attempts to claim it has have all failed; conflicts of interest at all steps in the DCD process, including the decision
to withdraw life support before DCD, are simply unavoidable; potentially harmful premortem interventions to
preserve organ utility are not justifiable, even with the help of the principle of double effect; claims that DCD
conforms with the intent of the law and current accepted medical standards are misleading and inaccurate; and
consensus statements by respected medical groups do not change these arguments due to their low quality
including being plagued by conflict of interest. Moreover, some arguments in favor of DCD, while likely true, are
“straw-man arguments,” such as the great benefit of organ donation. The truth is that honesty and trustworthiness
require that we face these problems instead of avoiding them. We believe that DCD is not ethically allowable
because it abandons the dead donor rule, has unavoidable conflicts of interests, and implements premortem
interventions which can hasten death. These important points have not been, but need to be fully disclosed to the
public and incorporated into fully informed consent. These are tall orders, and require open public debate. Until
this debate occurs, we call for a moratorium on the practice of DCD.
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Introduction
There have been many “consensus” statements addres-
sing the practice of donation after cardiocirculatory
death (DCD). In general, these claim that DCD con-
forms to clear ethical principles, respects the dead
donor rule, and is worthy of support [1-5]. Many believe
that the ethical problems of DCD have been “worked
out” and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted.
The dead donor rule is an “unwritten, uncodified stan-
dard that has guided organ procurement in the United
States since the late 1960s” [6]. This rule claims that
humans must be dead before vital organs can be taken,
and is intended to prevent the following: patients being
killed by organ retrieval, harm or exploitation of the
weak/vulnerable, mistrust of doctors and transplanta-
tion, and treating a patient merely as a means to organs
[6,7].
We argue for a moratorium on the practice of DCD
until full public disclosure and fully informed consent is
obtained from potential donors. Specifically, we will
argue that DCD donors may not yet be dead, conflicts of
interest in the decision to withdraw life support before
DCD are unavoidable, potentially harmful premortem
interventions during DCD cannot be justified even with
the rule of double effect, consensus statements are of low
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quality and plagued by conflict of interest, and that
claims that DCD conforms with the intent of the law and
current accepted medical standards are misleading and
inaccurate. Moreover, some arguments in favor of DCD,
while likely true, are “straw-man arguments,” such as the
substantial benefit of organ donation.
I The Process of DCD
In general, the current practice of controlled DCD can
be summarized as follows [1-5]. First, there is a decision
based on the patient’s wishes (either directly, or via a
substitute decision maker) or best interests (via a guar-
dian surrogate decision maker when the patient’s wishes
either are not known, or the patient was never compe-
tent) to discontinue life support therapy. This is typically
made in the situation of severe brain, neuromuscular, or
organ dysfunction when the burdens of continued life
support are felt to outweigh the benefits of delaying
death. Second, the patient/surrogate/guardian is offered
the “opportunity” for organ donation after death if
indeed death is pronounced by irreversible lack of circu-
lation. Third, after consent, the patient is withdrawn
from life support and death is awaited. If the circulation
stops within 1-2 hours, the patient is a DCD donor.
Fourth, death is declared after 2-10 minutes of absent
circulation, the time varying between hospitals and
countries, with the mechanism to determine absent cir-
culation varying as well. Fifth, the surgical team, at the
2-10 minute mark, begins surgical harvest of the organs
appropriate for donation. Often cannulas will have been
inserted in the femoral vessels prior to life support with-
drawal to facilitate rapid organ preservation at the 2-10
minute mark. Usually medications such as heparin and
phentolamine will have been given to the patient prior
to absent circulation to theoretically improve organ pre-
servation. This orchestrated expected death is called
“controlled DCD” to contrast with “uncontrolled DCD”
which refers to donation after unexpected cardiac arrest
with death pronounced after failed attempts at cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation.
II The Consensus Position
Protocols for DCD have attempted to clarify the justifi-
cation for this practice with a series of self-evident
truths [1-5]. First, the decision to withdraw life support
is made before any mention of DCD, and is not influ-
enced by the option of DCD. Indeed, the physicians
who discuss withdrawal are not in any way involved in
transplantation. Second, fully informed consent for DCD
is freely obtained for organ donation after death and for
any interventions done premortem. Third, after 2-10
minutes of absent circulation this state is permanent.
There are no cases of circulation restarting on its own
after this time period, and to try to restart circulation by
cardiopulmonary resuscitation is unethical given the
patient’s wishes to have a do not resuscitate order. For
these reasons, the absent circulation is irreversible, and
satisfies the legal, ontologic, and common-sense require-
ment of irreversibility of death. Fourth, premortem
interventions are done solely with the intent to improve
donated organ function, and if there is any potential to
hasten or cause death this effect is both unintended and
unavoidable. Finally, declaring death based on perma-
nent absence of circulation at 2-10 minutes conforms
with accepted medical standards, and with the intent of
the law regarding irreversibility and criteria for death.
We will argue that none of these claims can withstand
careful scrutiny.
III The Irreversibility of Death
In discussing death it is useful to review the paradigm
used to define it: death is an irreversible biological/onto-
logical event. As Bernat has argued, death is an event
separating the process of dying (living, while it seems
death is near) from the process of disintegration [8-10].
Bernat argues that death is a biological univocal ontolo-
gic state of an organism, and irreversible ("if the event
of death were reversible it would not be death but
rather part of the process of dying that interrupted and
reversed” [[8]p37]; “no mortal can return from being
dead, any resuscitation or recovery must have been from
a state of dying “) [[8,9]p124,8]. Others have argued for
the same paradigm, including the President’s Commis-
sion [11]. Philosophically, death is the irreversible state
where there has been loss of the integrative unity of the
organism as a whole; the organism is no longer more
than the sum of its parts, and irreversibly cannot resist
the disintegration entailed by the forces of entropy
[9-12]. The problem is that this accepted conception of
death and irreversibility is not compatible with DCD.
We aim to clarify the debate in the literature on this
point (Table 1).
Ontology and ‘construals’ of irreversibility
The ordinary sense of the meaning of irreversible is “not
capable of being reversed,” [13] and it “depends on what
physically can or cannot be done” [[14]p77]. The plain
meaning is that “no known intervention could have
eliminated it” [[15]p26]. If a condition is never actually
reversed it is permanent, but if a condition never could
be reversed it is irreversible [15]. In other words, irre-
versibility entails permanence; permanence does not
entail irreversibility [15]. The consensus on the moral
acceptability of DCD argues that a so-called weak ‘con-
strual’ of ‘irreversible’ is ‘permanent’ [1-5]. We argue
that ‘permanent’ is not a construal of ‘irreversible’ at all;
indeed, Bernat agrees when he writes “the weakest con-
strual falls outside the domain of irreversibility
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altogether, and resides properly within the domain of
permanence” [[9]p125]. Marquis provides an example
that makes this commonsense point:
Suppose that Joe has a heart attack and his circulatory
function stops. Fred, a physician standing next to Joe,
refuses to perform CPR on Joe because Joe is a rival...
Suppose that CPR would have been successful, but
because it was not performed, cessation of Joe’s circula-
tory function was permanent. Was Fred’s refusal to act
wrong? Not if we understand the irreversible cessation
of circulatory function as equivalent to the permanent
cessation of circulatory function... On that understand-
ing, Joe was dead as soon as he collapsed, and Fred’s
failure to perform resuscitation was not wrong, for he
had no obligation to resuscitate a corpse [[15]p26].
Moral decisions and the ethical/legal obligation not to
resuscitate
An objection to this scenario would be that in DCD an
informed autonomous moral decision has been made
not to attempt resuscitation, and this is why permanent
is an acceptable ‘construal’ of ‘irreversible’ in determin-
ing death [1-5]. This initially persuasive argument fails.
As Alister Browne writes, this tries “to perform the trick
of explaining how a physically reversible state can be
described as ‘irreversible’ by treating irreversibility as a
legal/moral concept... In ordinary usage, whether a per-
son is dead or alive depends on what physically can or
cannot be done to reverse that state, not on what leg-
ally/morally can or cannot be done” [[14]p77]. Marquis
elaborates on three problems with appealing to this nor-
mative ethical sense of ‘irreversible’ [15]. First, ‘reversi-
ble’ is a dispositional property having the capacity to
exhibit the occurrent property of ‘being reversed’ in the
appropriate circumstances. Similar dispositional proper-
ties are terms like ‘fragile’, and ‘soluble’. So, the question
is, does it make sense to say: it would be wrong (ethi-
cally) for me to deliberately break your fine china,
therefore, your fine china is not fragile; or it would be
wrong (ethically) for me to dissolve your gold ring in
acid, therefore, your ring is insoluble. Second, the neces-
sary condition of having an obligation to not resuscitate
the DCD donor is that the donor patient is alive. In the
example above, Fred had an obligation to resuscitate Joe
because a “necessary condition of Fred’s having an obli-
gation to Joe is that both Fred and Joe exist [are alive]”
[[15]p28]; that is why it was wrong for Fred not to
resuscitate Joe. Similarly, in DCD, it would be wrong for
a physician to attempt to resuscitate the donor patient.
But, this is because death’s irreversibility has ethical
consequences, the fact that a person is dead is the basis
for a change in our obligations, and the donor patient
was not yet dead. Third, many patients in exactly the
same state would be considered dead or alive depending
on whether resuscitation will be attempted; “but death is
a state of a body” [[15]p29]. Truog makes this point
when he describes three patients in the identical physio-
logical state who are dead (the DCD donor), alive (CPR
is started), and alive (the DCD donor whose parents
change their minds and demand resuscitation at 5 min-
utes) [16]. Marquis offers another example:
An individual is in a severe automobile accident and
arrives in the ER. You are the ER physician. You judge
that the patient’s blood loss is so great that the patient
will soon die unless she receives a blood transfusion.
Her surrogates decline the transfusion because she is a
Jehovah’s Witness. You respect the refusal and she dies.
You would say, of course: ‘Her condition was reversible!
I wish I could have transfused her!’... you would be
wrong to say that... since reversing the patient’s condi-
tion was not legally or morally permissible, the patient
should have been viewed as being in an irreversible con-
dition...[[15]p29].
Although some may argue that the state is just as
good as death, or is very close to death, we cannot say it
is death. “To say it is makes a word mean what it does
Table 1 Clarification of the arguments surrounding the interpretation of the ‘irreversibility’ of death
Absent circulation is irreversible at 2-10 minutes Absent circulation is not irreversible at 2-10 minutes
Permanent is a reasonable ‘construal’ of irreversible. The ordinary meaning of irreversible is ‘not capable of being reversed.’ Permanent is not a
‘construal’ of irreversible at all.
There is a moral/legal obligation not to resuscitate. Irreversible is not a moral/legal concept. The obligation to or not to resuscitate is due to the
patient being alive. Death is a state of a body, and those in exact states cannot be both dead
and alive.
There is no difference in outcome by waiting for
irreversibility.
This admits that permanence is a prognosis of death, not a diagnosis of death. The DCD
donor is living (even if he/she may be dying).
Autoresuscitation does not occur after 65 seconds
of absent circulation.
This is based on inadequate data (n = 5), and tries to explain away the Lazarus phenomenon.
Permanence accords with accepted medical
standards and the intent of the law.
This is misleading and inaccurate. This ignores ontologic and moral issues. This
mischaracterizes accepted medical standards. The intent of the law was not ‘permanence’.
Brain death is not required to diagnose death. The intent of the law is that there is only one death per person. DCD donors are not brain
dead.
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not, and to do that without warning is necessarily to
mislead” [[14]p78].
Consequentialism, utility, and prognosis
It is interesting that the proponents of DCD may in
some way recognize these flaws in the declaration of
death in the donor. Consensus statements simply state
that ‘permanent’ was the ‘construal’ of ‘irreversible’
accepted by the panels [1-5]. More recently, it has
been admitted that the declaration of death in the
donor is “a compromise on biological reality” [[9]
p128], “an approximation” [[8]p41], “inconsequential”
[[9]p129], “a valid proxy... produces no difference in
donor outcome” [[5]p975], and a perfect indicator/sur-
rogate/proxy of irreversible [8-10]. In other words,
“permanent cessation of circulation constitutes a valid
proxy for its irreversible cessation because it quickly
and inevitably becomes irreversible and because there
is no difference in outcome between using a perma-
nent or irreversible standard” [[17]p14]. Indeed, it has
been argued on a utilitarian basis that, “the good
accruing to the organ recipient, the donor patient, and
the donor family resulting from organ donation justi-
fied overlooking the biological shortcoming because
although the difference in the death criteria was real, it
was inconsequential’ [[8]p41].
We believe that these arguments may be used to
make a case for organ donation in the setting of DCD;
however, they cannot be used to argue that the donor
is dead. What these arguments show is that the DCD
donor has an almost certain prognosis of death, is in
the process of dying, but is still living and not yet
dead. Moreover, the accuracy of the prognosis depends
on a future event (whether resuscitation will be
attempted, whether autoresuscitation will occur), and
to claim the prognosis is certain relies on backward
causation. In philosophical terms, the prognosis is a
“soft fact” about the past, not determined until the
future events occur, and thus not a “hard fact” at all. It
is a “serious logical mistake by conflating a prognosis
of imminent death with a diagnosis of death” [[16]
p16]. If certain prognosis of death was equivalent to
death, then certain patients that are clearly alive would
have to be classified as dead; Truog mentions the
quadriplegic ventilator dependent man having ventila-
tor withdrawal, the patient dependent on ECMO due
to no underlying cardiac function having withdrawal of
ECMO, and the patient dependent on tube feeds hav-
ing these withdrawn [18]. Is a drowning man dead
because no one will swim out to save him? Or is he
merely going to die? It is a separate question whether
the patient can still be a donor while violating the
dead donor rule. There is also the question of whether
the donor’s prognosis is certain.
Autoresuscitation and the Lazarus phenomenon
The consensus statements that approve of DCD were of
poor quality when it comes to evidence based medicine,
and based on “expert opinion” [1-5]. It is repeatedly
claimed that there has been no case of autoresuscitation
occurring more than 65 seconds after loss of circulation
[1-5]. It is important to point out that this crucial ‘fact’
is based on very poor data limited by: small numbers (n
= 108) in 5 studies conducted from 1912-1970 of
patients aged 9 months to 87 years, poorly described
patient selection criteria, no description of whether
there was continuous clinical monitoring other than
ECG, no arterial line monitoring, many patients who did
have resuscitation attempts, and only 5 cases where
ECG monitoring was stated to have continued more
than 2 minutes after loss of cardiac activity (Table 2)
[19-23]. Remarkably, one of these studies reported a 25
year old woman who had asystole for 2.5 minutes fol-
lowed spontaneously by an atrioventricular rate of 33/
min [21].
Another form of autoresuscitation is called the
Lazarus phenomenon, which has been reported in at
least 32 cases [24]. These published cases describe
return of unassisted spontaneous circulation from a few
seconds to 33 minutes after failed CPR, although most
were not adequately monitored to determine the exact
timing of return of circulation [24]. Nevertheless, some
cases have had constant EKG monitoring with constant
observation and 6 of these had autoresuscitation at 5-7
minutes after absent circulation and asystole; some have
had arterial line monitoring in addition to continuous
EKG monitoring and constant observation, with 3 of
these having autoresuscitation at 3-5 minutes after
absent circulation and asystole; and some have had con-
stant observation and were found to have autoresusci-
tated 8-10 minutes after absent circulation with asystole
(Table 3) [25-37]. These cases are hypothesized not to
be similar to withdrawal of life support as in the setting
of DCD, because they all occurred after failed CPR [24].
The argument is that dynamic lung hyperinflation dur-
ing CPR may decrease venous return and, after stopping
ventilation, this will reverse and autoresuscitation occur;
or, that there was delayed delivery of resuscitation drugs
to the heart that led to delayed autoresuscitation [24].
The problem is that these do not explain the cases.
There are likely two types of Lazarus phenomenon:
one occurs after a short interval of 1-2 minutes and
may be due to resolution of hyperinflation with asso-
ciated venous return and drug delivery to the heart; the
other type with more delayed autoresuscitation cannot
be so explained [37,38]. Hyperinflation resolves within
seconds of stopping ventilation, as shown by studies
documenting lung derecruitment within seconds of dis-
connection from the ventilator; drug delivery to the
Joffe et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2011, 6:17
http://www.peh-med.com/content/6/1/17
Page 4 of 20
heart during asystole is difficult to explain [39]. It is
more likely that the Lazarus phenomenon is underre-
ported, and that after CPR (with monitoring more likely
to occur) it is more likely to be detected. The Lazarus
phenomenon indicates that autoresuscitation can occur
after absent circulation of many minutes.
Accepted medical standards and the intent of the law
Prominent DCD proponents have claimed that deter-
mining death is not primarily an ontologic issue
(whether the biological state of the organism is dead),
nor a moral issue (whether our obligations to the
patient are as if they are dead); rather, it is “fundamen-
tally a medical practice issue” [[17,40]p1762]. Although
ignoring ontology and moral issues is at best concern-
ing, we will examine the claim nevertheless. There are
two components to this claim. First, when physicians
declare death based on cardiocirculatory criteria in non-
DCD settings, they declare death at the moment they
verify loss of circulation, without a waiting period [2,5].
Second, the intent of the law, the President’s Commis-
sion in Defining Death, and the Uniform Determination
of Death Act, was a permanence standard of loss of cir-
culation, in accordance with the accepted medical stan-
dards [4,5]. Both of these claims are misleading, and
inaccurate.
First, the observation that physicians often do not
have a waiting time to verify irreversibility of absent
Table 2 Case series claimed to document lack of autoresuscitation
Study
(year)
n Selection criteria Monitoring
> 2 min*
AL Cont
obs
Author’s conclusions Comment
Stroud et
al (1947)
[19]
23 “When practical, the electrodes
were attached to the moribund
patient before clinical death...
tracings were taken intermittently
or continuously until the string
became motionless.” Age 10-87
yr; 1 child age 10 yr.
stated for n
= 2 (adults)
0 not
stated
“Permanent standstill occurred
without VF in 50% of cases.”
n = 2 not monitored at death,
leaving a true n = 21.
Enselberg
(1952)
[20]
43 “EKGs were recorded for varying
lengths of time before, during,
and after death... resuscitative
measures were applied in 22
cases.” Age 8-80 yr; 2 children
ages 8 yr and 14 yr.
not stated 0 not
stated
“Recurring asystoles or
ventricular standstills are
common and often appear to
be self-limited.”
“It is possible that in many
cases the recording of terminal
EKGs may have been stopped
upon the appearance of a long
asystole, before true cessation.”
Robinson
(1912)
[21]
7 “EKG records obtained from 7
patients before and during the
actual stoppage of the heart...
There were naturally many
failures to obtain records,
especially when fatalities
occurred suddenly.” Age 9 mo-37
yr; 3 children ages 9 mo, 18 mo,
and 4 yr.
stated for n
= 1 (age 9
mo)
0 not
stated
“Cardiac activity continued from
6-35 min after all the usual
clinical signs of death had
occurred.”
-Case 5 had resumption of
cardiac rhythm at a rate of 33
bpm “after a stoppage of 2 1/2
minutes.”
-Case 7 had no evidence of
cardiac activity “17 min post
mortem. Because the records
were not satisfactory, a more
detailed analysis is not
possible.”
Willius
(1924)
[22]
6 “... six patients in whom almost
continuous EKG records were
obtained from 10 min to 7 hr 32
min preceding death.” Age 29-58
yr (based on information for n =
4).
not stated
(4), several
minutes (1),
1 min 3.04
sec(1).
0 not
stated
“The changes occurring in the
mechanism of the human heart
preceding and during death are
variable...”
-
Rodstein
et al 1970
[23]
31 “A series of aged individuals in
whom terminal EKGs and
necropsies were available... Lead
II was then continuously
recorded until electrical activity
ceased... The time of cessation of
electrical activity- electrical death-
was recorded. Where clinically
indicated, the usual resuscitative
measures were employed.” Ages
73-101 yr.
stated for n
= 1.
0 not
stated
“The majority of deaths from all
causes showed an EKG pattern
of the dying heart...” In review
of the literature they report
“survival times after clinical
death [of up to 50 min].”
“In 7 (23%) of the 31 patients,
electrical death terminated in
VF... One patient terminated
with a rapid VT.”
TOTAL 110 Selection criteria poorly
described.
n = 5 n = 0 not
stated
variable terminal EKG patterns cannot determine if
autoresuscitation occurs
AL: arterial line; EKG: electrocardiogram; VF: ventricular fibrillation. Cont obs: continuous observation. *Monitoring > 2 min: refers to ongoing EKG monitoring for
> 2 min after death was pronounced based on EKG asystole or VF. This Table is modified and reproduced with permission of the author, and was originally
published in [37].
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circulation when commonly declaring death “is irrele-
vant in situations where following the dead donor rule
(DDR) requires knowing whether the patient is merely
dying or already dead... the accuracy that is required of
our assessments depends on the consequences of our
assessments being wrong... if one holds that the DDR is
an inviolate principle of organ donation, then the differ-
ence between ‘dying’ and ‘dead’ becomes crucial” [[16]
p16]. Joffe argued:
[the lead author of the recent Canadian forum on
DCD] writes that in the past “observation and confirma-
tion was not required and the irreversibility of death
was not a practical concern, although diagnostic errors
were made.” Acknowledging that “diagnostic errors were
made” shows that what death is has been clear in the
past. Outside the context of organ donation, when one
was claimed to be dead based on the irreversible loss of
circulation, if the patient was subsequently revived (by
autoresuscitation or intervention) and clearly alive, one
simply had to admit that the pronouncement of death
was incorrect. I do not believe that in this situation one
would continue to insist that the diagnosis of death was
correct, and that somehow the patient was revived from
the irreversible state known as death. This shows that
death in the past was understood as an irreversible state
of dis-integration of the organism. However, in the con-
text of DCD, we are now forced to “enhance the rigour
of the determination of death,” and would in this situa-
tion of revival have to explain somehow that the patient
in the irreversible (or “permanent”) state ‘death’ has now
somehow become alive [[37]p4].
Accepted medical practice is to declare death when
circulation is lost, and retrospectively know this was
correct after a period of time that verifies it is irreversi-
ble. If this retrospective ability is taken away, then we
believe physicians would be aware that death had not
yet occurred when circulation stopped.
Second, the claim that the intent of the law, the Presi-
dent’s Commission on Defining Death, and the UDDA
was a permanence interpretation of irreversible is not
tenable. The opinion that permanence was the intent
seems to have evolved over time, with Bernat in earlier
writings suggesting that it “may“ have been the intent,
and even earlier, that it was clearly not the intent [8,9].
In the late 1990s both Bernat and Capron (the Executive
Director of the President’s Commission) clearly did not
think it was the intent. Capron wrote in 1999:
The Pittsburgh protocol seems less a challenge to the
UDDA than simply a contradiction of it. The failure to
attempt to restore circulatory and respiratory functions
in these patients prevents lawfully declaring that death
has occurred because irreversibility must mean more
than simply ‘we choose not to reverse, although we
might have succeeded’... the actual point in each case at
which it becomes impossible to reverse the loss of func-
tions would be unaffected... in other words, ‘It’s hope-
less’- he would be confusing a prognosis for a
diagnosis... Thus, replacing ‘irreversible cessation of cir-
culatory and respiratory functions’ with ‘we choose not
to reverse’ flies in the face of the UDDA’s underlying
premise [[41]p132].
Bernat wrote in 1998:
The cessation of heartbeat and breathing must be pro-
longed because their absence must be of sufficient dura-
tion for the brain to become diffusely infarcted and for
the cessation of heartbeat and breathing conclusively to
be irreversible... It takes considerably longer than a few
minutes for the brain and other organs to be destroyed
from cessation of circulation and lack of oxygen. More-
over, it takes longer than this time for the cessation of
Table 3 Selected reported cases of autoresuscitation.
Author Age (yr) Diagnosis Rhythm Min* Outcome EKG AL Obs
Letellier [25] 80 Pulmonary edema asystole 5 normal + - +
Voekkel [26] 55 Sudden death asystole 7 death at 3 d + - +
MacGillivray [27] 76 COPD asystole 5 death 24 hr later + - +
Rosengarten [28] 36 asthma EMD 5 normal + - +
Abdullah [29] 93 sepsis asystole 5 not stated + ? +
Al-Ansari [30] 63 COPD asystole 3 normal + - +
Frolich [31] 67 MI asystole 5 normal d3; death d7 + + +
Casielles-Garcia [32] 94 hemorrhage EMD 3 death at 18 d + + +
Maleck [33] 80 sepsis asystole < 5 death at d2 + + +
Quick [34] 70 hyperkalemia asystole 8 normal - - +
Ben-David [35] 66 sudden VF asystole 10 normal - - +
Monticelli [36] 78 MI asystole > 10 death at 19 hr - - +
Monitoring of the patient is either present (+) or absent (-); the mode of monitoring is by continuous electrocardiogram (ECG), arterial line (AL), and/or
continuous clinical bedside observation (Obs). COPD: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; EMD: electromechanical dissociation; MI: myocardial infarction; VF:
ventricular fibrillation. *Min: time in minutes from stopping resuscitation in the stated rhythm to return of circulation.
This Table is modified and reproduced with permission of the author, and was originally published in [37].
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heartbeat and breathing to be unequivocally irreversible,
a prerequisite for death. As proof of this assertion, if
cardiopulmonary resuscitation were performed within a
few minutes of cardiorespiratory arrest, it is likely that
some of the purportedly ‘dead’ patients could be suc-
cessfully resuscitated to spontaneous heartbeat and
some intact brain function... The brief absence of heart-
beat and breathing is highly predictive of death in this
context [of DCD], but that at the time the organs are
being procured in the Pittsburgh protocol, death has not
yet occurred [p20]... the UDDA is a useful statute that
has been implemented in the majority of states in the
United States. Because of its unambiguous wording, suc-
cinctness, and for the sake of uniformity, I continue to
support its adoption...[[42]p21].
With these writings in mind, it is remarkable the
change that has occurred in more recent writings. For
example, Bernat wrote that “[the 2006] national confer-
ence affirmed the ethical propriety of DCD as not violat-
ing the dead donor rule” [[3]p281]. Bernat and Capron
wrote that although permanent cessation of circulation
has occurred before irreversible cessation of circulation,
“it is ethically and legally appropriate to procure organs
[because this]... is the meaning of ‘irreversible’ in the Uni-
form Determination of Death Act” [[5]p963]. Bernat also
wrote that “permanent was the intended construal of
irreversible in the UDDA” quoting personal communica-
tion from Capron Dec 15, 2008 [[17]p15], and March 17,
2009 [10]. Other authors who were part of the President’s
Commission on Defining Death have also expressed con-
cerns with DCD protocols, suggesting the intent of the
law was not a permanence standard [43-45]. The legisla-
tion in some states, and the case law from the few cases
that exist also make it clear that permanent is not an
acceptable interpretation of irreversible [46]. Some have
argued that DCD actually is at high risk of breaking the
law [47]. It has also been pointed out that “wherever the
Commission used the word ‘permanent’, it was followed
by a description of loss of function that cannot recover
because of ischemia, damage, destruction, or necrosis [i.e.
irreversible damage]. Neither intent nor action not to
resuscitate was mentioned as contingencies qualifying
‘permanent’ as ‘irreversible’” [[48]p1498,49]. Rady et al
also ask “did the President’s Commission intend for ‘irre-
versible’ to have different meanings within the uniform
determination of death act when determining death by a
circulatory standard vs. a neurologic standard?” [[48]
p1498,49] In brain death it is accepted that the lost func-
tions must be irreversible, not merely permanent. In
DCD, it apparently is not.
Brain death: two deaths, or one death?
Medicine, law, ethics, the President’s Commission in
Defining Death, the Law Reform Commission in Canada,
and proponents of DCD all agree that there is only one
death per person [11,41,42,50]. There is one phenomenon,
or state, of death. There happen to be two ways to diag-
nose this unitary state: the tests to confirm the irreversible
loss of all critical clinical functions of the brain including
the brainstem, and the tests to confirm the irreversible
loss of cardiocirculatory and respiratory functions. The
state of brain death, so the argument goes, is the state of
death, and irreversibly absent cardiocirculatory functions
is just the usual way of determining this state of the brain
[11,12,51]. As Capron explains, “The reason for alternative
standards for determining death is not that we believe
there are two kinds of death. On the contrary, there is one
phenomenon that can be viewed through two windows,
and the requirement of irreversibility ensures that what is
seen through both is the same or virtually the same thing.
Disregarding the requisite of irreversibility as it applies to
either standard is as destructive to the process of deter-
mining death as it would be to ignore the requisite of ces-
sation” [[41]p133]. This well accepted state of affairs is
currently being ignored in the setting of DCD.
At 10 minutes of absent circulation the brain is not
destroyed, and if resuscitation were implemented, some
will survive with some clinical and critical brain func-
tions [52-57]. It is very likely that over 15 minutes of
absent circulation is required before one can claim that
brain death will be likely [11,44,52-57]. Proponents of
DCD have argued that permanent absence of circulation
is a perfect surrogate for inevitable brain destruction,
again conflating prognosis with diagnosis [5]. They also
argue that the law states that death can be determined
by brain death tests or circulatory tests, not both, ignor-
ing the clear intent of the law [4,5]. They also point out
that after less than a minute of absent circulation some
studies show there is loss of electroencephalographic
brain activity, confirming lack of critical clinical brain
functions [4,5]. This argument is odd at best. Electroen-
cephalographic activity detects only cortical activity, and
for this reason has been questioned as an ancillary test
to diagnose brain death; it does not rule out subcortical
activity, nor critical brainstem functions [58]. If one was
serious about being sure clinical brain death was pre-
sent, relying solely on an EEG would be dangerous.
Moreover, a recent study of seven adults having with-
drawal of life support found all had surges of electroen-
cephalographic activity when the patients were pulseless
on arterial line, motionless, and with asystole or ventri-
cular escape rhythms; these surges “last for a few min-
utes at maximum, but usually last between 30-180
seconds” [59].
At the bottom of (or beyond) the slippery slope
We believe that not engaging the arguments we have
made questioning some aspects of DCD has led to
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serious problems. Although an appeal to a utilitarian
judgment is tempting, given the good consequences
(beneficience) from organ donation, we believe there are
also negative consequences. Alister Browne points to
some “good-looking” moral principles being violated in
DCD: never treat others as mere means, never interfere
with the liberty of individuals when they are not doing
or threatening harm to others, and never keep informa-
tion concerning matters of public policy from the people
in a democracy [14]. He also points out some undesir-
able effects: the consequences of discovery of the decep-
tion, whether it will set a precedent for deception
elsewhere, how it will affect the character of those
engaged in it, and the effect on democratic procedures
and institutions [14]. He urges that we “see the issues
clearly and face them squarely, to understand the
choices for what they are, and ourselves for who we are”
[[14]p85].
For proponents of DCD, the reason permanent is a
surrogate for irreversible is that the team and patient/
surrogate have decided that attempts to reverse it
(which we know would usually be successful) will not be
allowed ethically/legally to occur because there is an
agreed upon DNR order in place. In the setting of
uncontrolled DCD this has resulted in the reinstitution
of CPR (manual or by machine), or even institution of
cardiopulmonary bypass (extracorporeal life support),
once death is declared, in order to preserve the organs
[60-63]. So, the result is a full circle: the patient is dead
because we can use a weak ‘construal’ of ‘irreversible’,
and once that is accepted and the patient is declared
dead, we can resuscitate them with CPR and extracor-
poreal life support, the exact things that were forgone to
allow ‘death’, that were claimed legally disallowed and to
justify the creative definition of ‘irreversible’.
There are other reasons why our concerns with DCD
are even greater in this setting of uncontrolled DCD
(Table 4). It is noteworthy that in patients who are
dying with absent circulation that have CPR often for
over 1 hour, institution of extracorporeal life support
(Extracorporeal-CPR) is associated with good survival
and neurological outcome in over 40% of adults and
children [64-74]. We agree that “the thin line between
life and death, between rescue ECLS and in situ organ
perfusion” has been crossed [[74]p753]. The Institute of
Medicine wrote that this practice should be supported
[75-79]. To be fair, a recent consensus statement
admitted that this practice “retroactively negates” the
death diagnosis, and should not be done [5]. It is hard
to see how an irreversible state can be retroactively
reversed. A member of the President’s Commission
warned of this in advance:
Quite often, the carefully wrought initial protocols
give way over time to a more ‘pragmatic’ approach, ulti-
mately allowing interventions that would not have met
the stringent initial conditions... Past experience demon-
strates that efforts to evaluate the current protocol must
anticipate that its current restrictions are likely to be
relaxed significantly, here and elsewhere, once the pro-
tocol is endorsed in principle and put into practice. In
my own view, approving the protocol on the basis that
its current restrictive conditions will continue to provide
adequate protections is an exercise in self-delusion [[43]
p229].
Arnold and Youngner also warned of the “quieter
strategy of policy creep” [6].
Table 4 Increased concerns with the practice of uncontrolled donation after cardiocirculatory death
Area of concern Examples
The decision to withdraw life support is independent of
the DCD decision.
The decision to stop CPR is not independent of organ donation. As soon as CPR is
stopped, it is clear that organ donation procedures will start. The decision to stop CPR is
therefore a decision whether to attempt to save the life versus identify the patient as a
donor.
Informed consent is obtained for DCD. Consent is not truly informed. First, a signed donor card is a legally binding and
irrevocable decision, but unlikely informed [78,160]. Second, organ preservation is started
based on an “opting-out” system, prior to determination of donor status and prior to
contacting the family [79]. This “protects rather than infringes the family’s prerogative to
make decisions [about organ donation]” and “enhances autonomy”, allows the family the
“opportunity to donate”, “preserves family choice”, and is an “expression of respect” for the
family’s choice [75-77]. This assumes that the surgical steps taken to preserve organs are
“modest”, “minimally invasive”, and “only slight” [75-79]. These are at best arguable claims.
Absent circulation for 2-10 minutes is permanent, and
therefore is diagnostic of death.
The IOM claims that a “hands off period could be very brief and may even be
unnecessary” [75], apparently ignoring the cases of Lazarus phenomenon after stopping
failed CPR. In addition, re-starting CPR and/or ECMO clearly reverse the absent circulation,
and often allow resumed brain activity, and in the context of ECMO, often allow survival
with good neurological outcome [64-74].
Death declaration conforms with accepted medical
standards and with the intent of the law.
The accepted medical standard when using ECMO to rescue a patient during failed CPR is
to cool the patient for 24 hours, then slowly re-warm, and then assess prognosis
cautiously.
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IV Conflicts of Interest, the Withdrawal of Life
Support Decision, and the DCD Decision
The decision to withdraw life support cannot be
separated from consideration of DCD
Most DCD statements are clear that conflicts of interest
shall not influence decisions [1-5]. We believe that this is
impossible. First, it is said that the decision to withdraw
life support will be independent of the request and deci-
sion regarding DCD. The physician discussing withdrawal
of life support will be aware of the future option of DCD
and will not be able to prevent this from influencing his/
her opinion. Knowledge and experience of the great bene-
fit to patients with organ failures from organ transplanta-
tion, of several patients in the hospital now or recently
with these organ failures who are desperately awaiting an
organ, and of the academic and financial prestige to the
institution and colleagues from organ transplantation
activities are unavoidable. The psychology of decision
making is complex, but it is clear that bias need not be
consciously intentional, and that unconscious biases are
more potent and pervasive [80,81]. In addition, disclosure
of conflicts of interest, while morally required, do not
improve the situation, and have been shown to worsen the
influence of bias on decisions [82]. Further, it will not be
possible to ensure public acceptance of DCD without pro-
spective donors themselves being aware of the possibility
of DCD when they are critically ill.
Second, the risk of bias due to the availability of DCD
cannot be simply acknowledged and stated to be unac-
ceptable, therefore allowing one to pretend it has gone
away. A Canadian multicenter study found that of 341
adult patients who were assessed by a physician on at
least one occasion to have a probability of ICU survival
of < 10%, 99 (29%) survived the ICU [83]. Even for
those where this prediction was made on at least three
occasions, the actual survival was 27/120 (22.5%). When
the physician predicted a chance of survival of < 10%,
patients were more likely to have withdrawal of life sup-
port, and this prediction more powerfully predicted ICU
mortality than illness severity, evolving or resolving
organ dysfunction, use of inotropes or vasopressors, age,
and prior functional status [83,84]. Other studies have
found large variability in the accuracy of prognostication
by intensivists [85]; in the thresholds for and rates of
withdrawal decisions among intensivists, ICUs, and hos-
pitals [86-92]; and that this can and does lead to self-ful-
filling prophesies in predicting outcomes [93]. In the
Canadian multicenter study, 3.6% of patients having
withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in anticipation of
death were discharged home [84]; and in an interna-
tional ICU adult study the proportion of hospital survi-
vors that had withdrawal/limitation decisions ranged
from 2.4-30.3% [92]. The concern that DCD will unduly
bias these subjective decisions about withdrawal of life
support and alter outcome has been raised by others
[94-96]. We suggest that this bias can have major impli-
cations for patient prognosis from critical illness.
The decisions cannot be independent of transplant
personnel
Third, proponents of DCD claim that those involved in
transplantation will not be the ones who discuss DCD
and obtain consent from the patient/surrogate. This is
at best misleading. It may be true that the transplant
surgeons will not be the ones to explain and request
consent for DCD. However, it is not accurate to claim
that “no physician who has had any association with a
proposed transplant recipient that might influence their
judgment shall take part in the determination of death”
nor that “attending hospital staff caring for the recipient
should be different than staff caring for the donor” [[4]
pS9]. The physicians and nurses caring for terminally ill
ICU patients, discussing withdrawal of life support, and
discussing DCD, are the same ones who care for criti-
cally ill potential organ recipients and critically ill post-
operative transplanted patients. Whether they care for
the exact recipient of their most recent patient’s donated
organ is irrelevant. They care for both groups of patients
and this creates an unavoidable conflict of interest.
Fourth, we believe that conflict of interest matters are
actually encouraged in order to improve adoption of
DCD. The organ donation breakthrough collaborative
(supported by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services) has been actively encouraged by pro-
ponents of DCD, including the Institute of Medicine
[75,77]. The conflicts of interest inherent in this pro-
gram aimed at increasing donation rates are obvious
(Table 5) [97]. The so-called “team huddle” that allows
early involvement of procurement coordinators with
medical teams and critically ill patients bundles “what is
in the patient’s best interests (i.e. delivery of appropriate
medical care) with the procurement coordinator’s pri-
mary interest (i.e. securing consent to donate...) [[49]
p1075]. Perhaps most telling is that a solution to per-
ceived barriers to consent and conflicts of interest in
obtaining consent is to have a trained representative of
the organ procurement organization engage in the
“impartial” donation discussion [75,97]. These trained
requestors can then emphasize the “opportunity” to
donate, that doing so “can save the lives of one or more
people”, and thereby “give back something to the com-
munity in return for what we have received from it
through life”, that donation “does not harm anyone”,
and it is “a way of passing on the gift of life to others”
[98]. The “Spanish Model” of organ donation with high
consent rates is based on: in-house intensive care/
anesthesia physicians who are transplant coordinators
and participate in treatment of the patient, and who
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have a basic low pay with incentive bonuses tied to
organ retrieval success; comparisons between centers to
foster competition; and less withdrawal of life support
resulting in therapeutic ventilation and high proportions
of brain deaths after brain injury [99-101].
Although most consensus statements recognize poten-
tial conflicts of interest, we believe they make misleading
claims that these conflicts are dealt with and therefore
not a concern.
V Premortem Interventions, and the Principle of
Double Effect
Premortem interventions are often used to theoretically
improve the condition of donated organs in DCD,
although there is no evidence that they improve out-
comes [102]. These interventions include insertion of
cannulas to allow rapid preservative solutions to be
infused on declaration of death, administration of
heparin to prevent clotting when circulation stops, and
administration of phentolamine to improve perfusion to
the organs during the process of dying (while still liv-
ing). There are several problems with these practices,
even with consent.
First, these interventions are, in theory, to benefit the
organ recipient, not the donor. It is questionable
whether the donor can consent to an intervention that
cannot benefit him/her and has a significant risk of
harm and of hastening or causing death. It has been
Table 5 The Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative Best Practices, and Conflict of Interests
Category Examples quoted from the published report [97] Page
Job Security Hiring, supervision, and recognition are linked to performance [rates of consent]. v, 10,
30
Accountability among hospital staff may be driven by hospital administration... Hold their staff accountable to
performance.
v, 11-
12
Regularly track performance, and use data systems to track results at the staff member and organizational levels. Staff
are held accountable.
v. 30
Healthy
Competition
Reporting data by ICU fosters a healthy competition among units. 11
Nurses reported that this sense of competition led to improvement in referrals and consents. 63
Call Early Nurses automatically look at the white board to see if any patients look like potential donors. viii, 44
Conduct regular rounds in high potential ICUs... They are the most likely OPO personnel to identify potential donor
cases early; they raise hospital staff awareness...
44,
In house coordinators interacted with families as extensions of hospital nursing staff... OPO staff do not “hover” waiting
for organs but do discretely monitor the patient’s condition.
14, 56
He is already thinking about organ donation upon the arrival of certain types of patients in the emergency room. 55
Goal is “yes” Getting to an informed “yes” is paramount. ix, 29,
57
Bordering on
coercion
Assigns only those nurses [champions] to potential donor cases. 56, 58
Importance of ‘setting the stage’ for consent well ahead of the declaration... becoming familiar with family dynamics
and establishing a relationship with the key family decision-makers... bringing the family food and blankets... this type
of ‘surveillance’ information was reported to be extremely useful in tailoring approaches to families for consent.
57, 58
[Use the requestor] with the strongest connection or bond with the family... and has a history of achieving families’
consent to donate.
58
Presenting the donation request as a personal story, giving examples of transplant recipients. 61
Proximity to transplant recipients as an opportunity to heighten the immediacy of need for organ donation. 68
Incentives Often given incentives to perform well: compensation, bonuses, performance reviews... Financial incentives for
achieving these targets [consents per year]...
11, 23
Sessions at times ‘when staff are hungry’... and bring more than enough food to serve all attendees. 42, 49
Distributes pens, notepads, and mugs. 44
Invites physicians, residents, and nurses to baseball games, hockey games, annual dinners and other outings to
maintain buy-in, strengthen relationships, and recognize high performance.
49, 51
Visit high-referring ICUs with dinner... sent the physician a box of his favorite cigars. 49
Business model Strategically recruits high profile members of business and civic community to sit on the board of governors...
Strategically appoints top officials from high donor potential hospital to its board... Strategically select influential,
potentially pro-donation hospital personnel to serve on their boards... they do expect them to be champions for organ
donation and accessible to the OPO for immediate as well as longer-term needs for facilitating organ donation.
20, 37,
45
Orient operations towards outcomes rather than processes. 28
If you secure doctors of high stature, it will facilitate mid-level doctor support. 47
They serve as a ‘committee of ears’... 47
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argued that these interventions are unlikely to hasten or
cause death [3,4]. We believe that this is inaccurate. If
heparin was very safe, we would not carefully consider
who we give therapeutic heparin to, and would not
worry about life-threatening bleeding complications. If
phentolamine was very safe, we would not worry about
hypotension induced in patients it is given to. The fact
is, these are potentially dangerous medications, with
potentially life threatening complications. Bleeding, and
hypotension, and anesthesia for inserting cannulas could
each either make it more likely that death will ensue on
withdrawal of life support, or that death will be hastened
after withdrawal of life support. These complications
can and do occur even in patients without high risk for
their development. For example, in adults the risk of
major bleeding associated with therapeutic heparin is up
to 3%, is higher in the setting of ischemic stroke or after
recent surgery or trauma, and still higher with higher
doses of heparin [103]. In children, the risk of major
bleeding with therapeutic heparin in PICU patients was
24% [104,105]. In DCD, the dose of heparin used is
much higher than the therapeutic doses used in these
studies. Moreover, if heparin prevents no-reflow phe-
nomenon in brain, it may actually prolong the time
needed for brain death to occur.
Second, we agree with others that “to summon the
protection of the principle of double effect by claiming
that since donation benefits the patient and family by
complying with their wishes, use of these agents is per-
missible, is an extreme example of professional sophis-
try” [106]. In the principle of double effect as applied to
heparin administration, four factors must be present: the
action (giving heparin) must be intrinsically good
(obtaining functional organs); the bad effect (death) may
be foreseen but the agent must only intend the good
effect; the bad effect must not be a means to the good
effect; and the good effect must be proportional to
(compensate for, or outweigh) the bad effect [107]. We
question whether the bad effect (death) is not intended,
whether the bad effect (death) is not a means to the
good effect (obtaining functional organs), and whether
the good effect (obtaining functional organs) is propor-
tional to the bad effect (death). Weisbard wrote:
... the so-called ‘foreseen but unintended’ bad conse-
quence in a double effect argument must be genuinely
not desired... The presupposition of the conventional
double effect argument is that the patient’s death is the
foreseen, but unintended and undesired, consequence of
an effort to relieve pain... I find it simply impossible to
take these assurances at face value in the context of a
transaction whose entire purpose and reason for being
is to bring about the death of the patient in a fashion
that produces viable organs for transplantation... the
protocol seeks to recharacterize a coherent, carefully
worked out chain of events, leading inexorably to a fore-
seen, desired and planned result-death and utilization of
organs for transplant- as a series of isolated links, each
to be understood solely as directed to the patient’s
needs of the moment, each entirely disconnected from
all surrounding context, including the very purpose of
the exercise...[[43]p222].
VI Straw-man arguments
We have found that it is common to respond to some of
our concerns with so-called “straw-man” arguments.
The Oxford dictionary of philosophy writes “to argue
against a straw man is to interpret someone’s position
in an unfairly weak way, and so argue against a position
that nobody holds, or is likely to hold” [108]. The argu-
ments are against points that are not held by the oppo-
nent, and include: those opposed to DCD are simply
against organ donation; and that we do not acknowledge
that the family are often the ones who want to donate in
DCD, the family deserves the opportunity to donate and
have some good come of a terrible event, organ trans-
plantation saves many lives, and thousands of people die
every year on a transplant waiting list [109,110]. To clar-
ify our position on these arguments: we are not against
organ donation; the family that wants to donate in DCD
is not truly informed when they consent to donation
after death; the family does deserve the opportunity to
donate in appropriate circumstances; organ transplanta-
tion saves many lives; and people do die on transplant
waiting lists. Another claim is that surveys show the
public is willing to accept DCD [4,111]. This is simply
misleading, given that the public in these surveys is
asked if they agree to organ donation after death, with-
out explanation about the controversy in diagnosis of
death [112,113]. When the controversy is revealed, sur-
veys do not suggest strong support for the deception
[112-114]. We do not believe these arguments have any
bearing on whether the donor in current DCD protocols
is actually dead. Further education on these straw-man
arguments is not necessary. We agree with Zamperetti
et al when they wrote “declaring that the patient’s death
has already taken place is morally questionable and
scientifically untenable... the risk [is] of confusing genu-
ine education and adequate awareness with manipula-
tion of people’s opinions..."[[115]p1674].
There are argument against DCD that we recognize
also may be straw-man arguments. The process of DCD
has been suggested to alter good end-of-life care. Some
have called this “the forgotten donor” [116]. The recent
Presidents Council was concerned that: families offered
DCD may feel pressured to decide in favor, the process
may interfere with good palliative care, the family’s emo-
tional needs and mourning may suffer ("considering that
loved ones must be kept ‘out of the surgeons’ way’
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immediately after the patient’s heart stops beating”)
[[51]p82], and rushing to make a death determination
“could make the donor’s death seem like a mere formal-
ity” [[51]p86]. We list this as a straw-man argument
because it does not influence the debate about irreversi-
bility of death, and it is unclear whether proponents of
DCD would disagree with it. The recent cases of infant
heart donation after 75 seconds of absent circulation
demonstrate the extremes that DCD protocols have
gone to [117]; nevertheless, many proponents of DCD
have criticized this extreme time interval to declaration
of death making it a position they do not hold [5]. The
suggestion that heart transplant after DCD demonstrates
the reversibility of cardiac death has been suggested by
proponents of DCD as missing the point: it is circula-
tion and not heart function that is to be permanently
lost [5,10,118,119]. Some consider this sophistry (after
all, the debate about autoresuscitation applies to heart
function, and the normal cases rely on diagnosis of the
loss of heart function), and are unconvinced (circulation
is restored in the recipient, likely demonstrating the
reversibility of absent circulation in the donor; saying
loss of circulation was permanent because the heart was
removed, and the heart was removed because loss of cir-
culation was permanent is circular) [15,120-122]. We do
not focus on this debate in this paper.
VII The overwhelming consensus
The concerns with DCD should be debated on their
merits without undue deference to prominent consensus
statements of expert opinion. Nevertheless, we recognize
that several respected groups have published consensus
statements that have been said to affirm that DCD as
currently done is ethically sound [1-5,75,123]. We do
not believe these statements adequately address our
concerns.
Consensus statements in general, and those on DCD
in particular, are of low quality when assessed by evi-
dence based medicine standards [124]. The main limita-
tions are in the categories of stakeholder involvement,
rigor of development, and editorial independence (Table
6) [125]. Most of the statements involve predominantly
transplantation experts and lay public that are either
transplant recipients or known to support transplanta-
tion, have not systematically reviewed the literature on
autoresuscitation or Lazarus phenomenon, have been
based on expert opinion, have had unclear panel selec-
tion and consensus building methods, and have been
funded and organized by transplantation organizations.
Many explicitly acknowledge that their objective was
not to determine whether DCD complies with ethical
norms or the dead donor rule [1,4,5,75,123].
There is a large and growing list of authors who have
raised many of our concerns with DCD, and who have
concluded that DCD donors are not dead [13-16,46,48,49,
106,115,116,126-132]. This list includes the recent Presi-
dent’s Council: “In truth, there is reason to doubt that the
cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions is irre-
versible, in the strict sense... To call the loss of functions
irreversible, it must be the case that the functions could
not possibly return, either on their own or with external
help... If this [attempted resuscitation] were to occur, the
patient would certainly not have been ‘resurrected’, but
instead would have been (according to the cardiopulmon-
ary standard of death) resuscitated, i.e., prevented from
dying” [[51]p83]. They do not settle the issue, writing that,
with more research, “assurance that the heart will not
restart on its own within the relevant time frame, com-
bined with an informed decision by the patient and family
in favor of controlled DCD, may or may not be sufficient
as a moral warrant for declaring death...[[51]p87]. They do
suggest that the family should be informed of “the contro-
versies about irreversibility” and that “there ought to be a
broader public discussion and debate about the propriety
of controlled DCD” [[51]p86].
VIII Pediatric Considerations
The practice of DCD has been endorsed by the Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics, including the concerning
suggestion for “timely referral...[that] may start in the
emergency department with the admission of a critically
injured child... Deliberation with the OPO should occur
before or when...’withdrawal-of-care’ or ‘do-not-resusci-
tate’ options are being discussed” [[133]p823]. Of further
concern, it was later clarified that when referring to
“deciding when human beings are dead... it is not the
purpose of this policy statement to answer those ques-
tions, but to raise awareness of them” [134].
Concerns with DCD are increased in children. First,
there is even less data regarding autoresuscitation and
Lazarus phenomenon; only 6 children were included in
the studies identified by the Institute of Medicine (Table
2) [19-21], and we are aware of only three published
cases of (the early form of) Lazarus phenomenon in
children [38,135]. This makes determination of
“accepted medical standards” in declaring death proble-
matic. Second, conflicts of interest are even more diffi-
cult to ignore in pediatric critical care, where units are
multidisciplinary, and the same personnel care for
potential donors and recipients [136]. Variability in end-
of-life decisions among pediatric intensivists [87,137],
and lack of validated prognostic systems for critically ill
children increase the risk of premature determination of
withdrawal decisions [138]. Third, it is unclear how to
apply informed consent to the DCD setting in children.
In children (particularly under age 14 years), premor-
tem decisions are made using the best interests standard
by surrogate decision makers, usually the parents
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Table 6 Consensus statements regarding donation after cardiocirculatory death from prominent medical groups, and
some comments
Consensus
Group
Funding Stated Goal Examples of concerns
National
Conference on
DCD, 2006 [3]
Transplant
organizations
“To address the increasing experience of DCD and to
affirm the ethical propriety of transplanting organs from
such donors...[and] to expand the practice of DCD in
the continuum of quality end-of-life care.”
1. “By new developments not previously reported, the
conference resolved controversy regarding the period of
circulatory cessation that determines death and allows
administration of pre-recovery pharmacologic agents.”
These new developments were not described nor
referenced.
2. Claim there are two different mutually exclusive types
of death such that “the cardiopulmonary criterion may
be used when the donor does not fulfill brain death
criteria.”
Interdisciplinary
panel, 2010 [5]
Transplant
organization
“To re-examine the standards for death determination
and to analyze the new protocols’ compliance with
these standards.”
1. Claim that death is “fundamentally a medical practice
issue and not primarily a moral or ontological issue [[40]
p1762].”
2. Claim that permanent cessation of circulation “is the
meaning of ‘irreversible’ in the Uniform Determination of
Death Act.” Therefore, it “is ethically and legally
appropriate to procure organs when permanent
cessation of circulation has occurred but before
irreversible cessation.” Yet, the lead authors previously
wrote that ‘permanent’ is not compatible with the intent
of the UDDA [41,42].
Institute of
Medicine, 1997
[1]
Transplant
organization
“This report examines medical and ethical issues in
recovering organs from NHBDs who do not meet the
standard of brain death.”
1. Accepted the premise “at the outset [that] recovery of
organs from NHBDs should be considered a reasonable
source of organs whose potential deserves serious
exploration... It can be concluded, therefore, that the
recovery of organs from NHBDs is an important,
medically effective and ethically acceptable approach to
closing the gap...[p45-46]”
2. The meaning or irreversible “must rest on expert
medical opinion [p59].”
3. Ethical issues were presented to the IOM staff by “the
chair of the committee that developed the Pittsburgh
protocol for NHBDs in 1992 [p85].” The project heard
presentations from those representing “medical and
surgical transplantation, organ procurement, the bioethics
of transplantation, donors, recipients, and the federal
government [p45].”
Institute of
Medicine, 2000
[123]
Transplant
organization
“An effort designed to facilitate the adoption by all
OPOs of protocols regarding NHBD.”
1. Did not re-address the determination of death.
Affirmed two different types of death: “the UDDA
specifies the irreversible loss of all brain function or the
irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary function, not
both [p24].”
Institute of
Medicine, 2006
[75]
Transplant
organization
“To study the issues involved in increasing the rates of
organ donation.”
1. Did not re-address the determination of death.
Claimed that ‘permanent’ is “a reasonable interpretation
of the concept of ‘irreversibility’ and is compatible with
the probable intentions of the Commission that
formulated the UDDA definition and with the UDDA’s
reference to ‘accepted medical standards’ [p172].”
2. Suggested uncontrolled DCD with reinstitution of CPR/
ECMO, and supporting adopting the organ donation
breakthrough collaborative, and suggested adopting
“steps for preparation for such donation to the end of
their [American Heart Association] standard resuscitation
protocols [p185].”
3. A national workshop including “care providers, organ
procurement professionals, and families who supported
non-heart-beating donation [p2].”
SCCM Ethics
Committee,
2001 [2]
Unclear “To comment on the issues of timing of death.” 1. Suggest a long observation time for certification of all
deaths “flies in the face of both logic and the
contemporary notion of death certification [p1872].”
However, they did not discuss that in the context of
DCD, and unlike in the ‘routine’ death diagnosis, following
the dead donor rule requires knowing whether the
patient is merely dying or already dead; diagnostic errors
are not allowed, a retrospective diagnosis is not possible,
and the long time of observation is required..
2. “Did not achieve unanimity regarding the single ‘best’
observation period for asystole, apnea, and
unresponsiveness.”
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[139,140]. This differs from adults where decisions are
often made by a substitute decision maker based on the
previously expressed wishes of the patient (made when
he/she was competent) [140]. For the never having been
competent child the primary concern should be the best
interest of the child, based on a complete and truthful
assessment of benefits and burdens from the perspective
of the child [139-141]. The obligation is not to society
or the health care system; rather, it is to the child [140].
The best interests standard “does not fit well” with the
process of DCD because there is no benefit to the child
[2]. It is unclear how to justify the statement that “every
family should be given the opportunity to allow their
loved one to become an organ donor” [[133]p826]. The
Society of Critical Care Medicine stated that “an altruis-
tic model argues that organ donation will result in such
great benefit to both the family of the deceased child
and to the recipient families that the intervention is jus-
tified. Currently, there is broad support for organ dona-
tion following death in pediatric patients after
appropriate informed consent” [[2]p1829]. However,
they also write that “altruistic motives for donation can-
not be presumed or inferred for pediatric patients” [[2]
p1829]. Particularly in DCD, we are worried children
may be used as a means to an end, since only others
benefit from the donation. The child may experience
anxiety, loneliness, and fear of abandonment/isolation
due to lack of optimal palliative care as life support is
withdrawn in the operating room [141]. The family may
be deprived of the ability to perform death rituals, of
holding the child as they die, and extended family/
friends may be excluded from being with their loved
one while living their final moments or hours [141]. The
effects on the quality of death, and the subsequent grief
of the family/friends are unclear.
These concerns are not merely theoretical. A recent
review of pediatric DCD policies found variable and
concerning practices (Table 7) [142]. Similar variability
in policies has been found in adult DCD protocols
[1,123]. The remarkable variation in DCD protocols,
including the timing and techniques to determine absent
circulation, suggest a lack of “accepted medical
standards.”
IX The need for informed consent
That DCD violates the dead donor rule leads to impor-
tant implications. If the dead donor rule is inviolable,
then we must change the practice of organ donation to
make it truly consistent with the dead donor rule, risk-
ing the lower quality of organs that would be donated.
If the dead donor rule is not inviolable, then informed
voluntary consent in terminally ill patients to violate the
dead donor rule and allow organ donation as the proxi-
mate cause of death is required [6,7,126,127,143]. The
only argument for maintaining the status quo would be
to point out the good consequences that result, includ-
ing saving lives by organ transplantation and maintain-
ing trust in the medical/transplantation systems
[5,8,9,144]. However, we believe that consequentialist
calculations in defining death are irrelevant given that
our concern is the actual state (death) of the patient.
We seek to diagnose the univocal state of death, regard-
less of the consequences. As Nair-Collins has pointed
out, “biological reality [biological death] is what it is,
whether we like it or not... What the argument [from
utility] advocates, however, is for the medical commu-
nity to intentionally deceive the public about the biolo-
gical reality of death” [[145]p681]. He goes on to say
that “trust is at the foundation of medicine...[the argu-
ment] advocates doing something that is antithetical to
the very existence of the institution of medicine..."[[145]
p681]. Similarly, others point out that the most good/
bad consequences can do “is give us a reason for keep-
ing quiet about (or exaggerating) the real status of the
condition. The bad consequences cannot stop a condi-
tion from being a disorder... it is not clear that that
would justify anything other than a piece of large scale
public dishonesty” [[146]p67].
We believe that truthful, complete, voluntary, fully
informed consent to organ donation is required. This
best respects patient autonomy [139,140,147]. Signed
donor cards and donor registries do not indicate fully
Table 6 Consensus statements regarding donation after cardiocirculatory death from prominent medical groups, and
some comments (Continued)
Canadian
Forum, 2006 [4]
Transplant
organization
“To inform and guide health care professionals involved
in developing programs for DCD... Discussion at the
forum was restricted to optimal and safe practice in the
field as it pertains to DCD.”
1. Presentations were heart “by experts from international
jurisdictions where DCD is currently practiced [pS2].”
Adopted “a weaker interpretation” of irreversible,
apparently simply echoing the IOM and SCCM reports.
2. Claim that “there has been speculation that a
phenomenon known as autoresuscitation may exist.”
3. Claimed that “based on animal studies and isolated
human case reports electrical function of the brain ceases
within 20s after circulatory arrest [pS8],” not
acknowledging that this EEG activity reflects only the
superficial cortical activity of cerebral hemispheres, not
adequate to suggest brain death has occurred [58].
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informed consent to organ donation; the information
provided to the potential donor on organ procurement
organizations websites is at best incomplete [148]. We
agree with Browne that “if the aim is not just to main-
tain trust, but to do so by being trustworthy, deliberate
deception that bypasses transparency and consent is for-
bidden... The real issue at stake is thus not what the
IOM identifies, but whether trustworthiness is a value
to be sought” [[14]p85].
A potential challenge to our call for fully informed
consent could be the claim that organs are property,
and organ donation is governed by gift law. It has been
argued that organ donation would thus require only a
donation intent, and not informed consent, as there are
neither risks nor benefits to a deceased donor from
donation, and the decision may occur completely out-
side the doctor-patient relationship (as in signing a
donor card or onto a donor registry) [149-151]. This
view is reflected in the current OPTN “proposal to
update and clarify language in the DCD model ele-
ments” that has changed the wording of “consent”
[implying informed consent] to “authorization”
[152,153]. We believe this change is neither good policy
nor an acceptable answer to our concerns, for several
reasons. First, authorization of, and the intent of the
“anatomical gift” is conditional on the death of the
donor; if the donor is unaware that DCD violates the
dead donor rule, it would be hard to argue that the gift
was voluntarily authorized. By violating the dead donor
rule, DCD would be a form of living donation, and
donation of a vital organ a form of physician assisted
death. For this reason, we believe that mere “authoriza-
tion” would be inadequate, and that DCD should surely
require fully informed consent when and if allowed at
all [154,155]. Second, authorization of the “anatomical
gift” outside of the doctor-patient relationship assumes
that the diagnosis of death is made objectively by doc-
tors, without (even unconscious) bias in the decision to
withdraw life-support or determine death. Of note, the
OPTN proposal strikes any reference to the decision to
withdraw life support being made before evaluating a
patient as a DCD candidate, or of needing confirmatory
tests of absent circulation (such as arterial line monitor-
ing) [152]. Third, premortem interventions are not done
after death, and have real harms and benefits that
require informed consideration by potential donors. In
addition, the end-of-life (prior to death) care provided
to the donor is altered and should require informed
Table 7 Concerns with policies on donation after cardiocirculatory death in children’s hospitals in the United States,
Canada, and Puerto Rico [142].
Topic of concern Examples % of
protocols
Death
determination
Pulselessness can be determined by palpation alone (a highly inaccurate method [161,162]. 14%
No specification of method to determine pulselessness. 11%
No specification of duration of absent circulation until organ harvest. 10%
Fewer than 5 minutes of absent circulation until organ harvest. 10%
Conflicts of
interest
Transplant personnel are precluded from declaring death. 88%
Transplant personnel are excluded from premortem donor management. 51%
Physicians caring for potential organ recipients are excluded from participating in premortem donor management
or declaration of donor death.
32%
If the family raises a question about organ donation, donation after cardiocirculatory death can be discussed with
the family prior to a withdrawal of life support decision.
21%
Premortem
interventions
Premortem interventions are prohibited. 3%
Premortem heparin is used. 55%
Premortem vasodilator(s) are used. 18%
Premortem vessel cannulation is used. 36%
Consent is required for premortem interventions. 75%
Palliative care of
donor
Medication intended to hasten death is precluded. 44%
Withdrawal of life support occurs only in the operating room. 54%
Of those having withdrawal of life support in the operating room, the family is allowed to remain until death is
declared.
48%
The family is permitted to view the body after organ removal. 27%
Voluntariness of
consent
The family can withdraw consent at any time. 16%
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consent [116]. Fourth, some argue that it is not clear
that DCD donors are incapable of an experience of pain
or suffering [7,154,156], particularly if circulation is re-
established with CPR or ECMO. Whether raw affective
experience from brainstem and subcortical structures
[157] is possible at 2-5 minutes after absent circulation
is unknown.
The United States Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services has held that “... there must be a minimum
standard to assure that when families provide consent,
they are providing informed consent... potential donor
families receive the information they need to make an
informed decision about donation...” [158]. A large
group of pediatric intensive care clinicians, in respond-
ing to our call for a moratorium on DCD, claimed that
a moratorium would deprive parents of the “ability to
make a truly ‘informed’ decision about what we should
hold sacred, how one chooses to die” [159]. In view of
these statements by proponents of DCD, it is surprising
that the OPTN proposal seeks to remove an informed
consent requirement for DCD. We agree with others
that the dead donor rule that is said to justify the gift
law interpretation of authorization for organ donation
after death hides the normative nature of the donation
decision, and “disguises moral judgments by pseudo-
objective claims [about death]” [7].
X Conclusions: a call for a moratorium on DCD
pending fully informed consent
We have argued that DCD donors are not dead, and
therefore that organ donation during DCD violates the
dead donor rule. Our concerns with DCD include the
following: irreversibility of absent circulation has not
occurred and the many attempts to claim it has all fail;
conflicts of interest at all steps in the DCD process are
simply unavoidable; premortem interventions to pre-
serve organ utility are not justifiable; and consensus
statements by respected medical groups do not change
these arguments. The truth, we believe, is that honesty
requires that we face these problems instead of avoiding
them. Until the concerns we describe are seriously con-
sidered, full public disclosure occurs, and fully informed
consent is obtained from donors, there should be a
moratorium on the practice of DCD. We believe that
DCD is not ethically allowable because it abandons the
dead donor rule, has unavoidable conflicts of interests,
and implements premortem interventions which can
hasten death. These important points have not been,
but need to be fully disclosed to the public and incor-
porated into fully informed consent. These are tall
orders, and require open public debate. Until this
debate occurs, we call for a moratorium on the practice
of DCD.
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